A Boko Haram faction entrenched in Shiroro, Niger State, less than 200km from Abuja, has emerged as the group’s furthest and most successful outpost beyond the Lake Chad Basin, new evidence has shown.
According to ongoing research by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), the Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) faction has deeply embedded itself in Niger’s forested communities, fusing jihadism with local banditry to secure a strategic base in Central Nigeria.
The ISS findings, based on interviews with defectors, survivors and women who escaped from forced marriages with fighters, offer the clearest picture yet of the cell’s operations and its growing influence.
The group, led by Abubakar Saidu, popularly known as Sadiku, operates camps in forest enclaves such as Kugu, Maganda and Dogon Fili.
From these bases, it has launched deadly attacks on civilians, security forces and infrastructure across Shiroro, Munya and Rafi local government areas.
A native of Biu in Borno State, Sadiku was deployed to Niger in 2014 by former Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau.
His mission was to reconnect with remnants of the ultra-Salafist Darul Islam group dislodged from Mokwa in 2009.
While Darul Islam initially rebuffed Boko Haram, Sadiku managed to win over some of its scattered followers and formed a local cell with support from Fulani armed groups.
“Sadiku began shuttling between Borno and Niger, gradually embedding himself in the Alawa Forest area. By 2021, the cell had escalated its attacks significantly,” the ISS report said.
Unlike the rival Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), JAS in Shiroro is ideologically fluid, tolerating behaviours such as alcohol use, drug consumption, and prostitution among its allied bandit groups.
A woman formerly married to a JAS fighter told ISS that Boko Haram clerics in the north-east frowned on this laxity, but Sadiku defended it, arguing that “the Fulani would change with time.”
The cell’s leadership is also unconventional. Rather than the rigid command hierarchy seen in other jihadist groups, Shiroro operates under the authority of warlords adopting the nomenclature of local bandit networks.
One such warlodd was notorious bandit leader Dogo Gide, who later fell out with Sadiku. However, ISS sources suggest that JAS commander Bakura Doro, who operates from Lake Chad’s Barwa Island, may be mediating a reconciliation.
Defectors say Doro supplies the Shiroro cell with arms, some of which are transported in boats disguised with grass and fish. These supplies are supplemented with weapons looted from Nigerian security forces or smuggled in via Sahelian routes.
The group’s income is also sustained by kidnap-for-ransom operations, extortion and forced taxation.
A Premium Times and ISS investigation confirmed that boys are abducted and forced into indoctrination camps and labour, while women and girls are kidnapped and forced into marriage.
Despite Nigeria’s focus on the Lake Chad region in its counter-terrorism efforts, the Shiroro cell has largely evaded detection due to its dispersion across forest communities and the military’s retreat from ground operations after sustaining casualties.
The ISS report also revealed growing ties between JAS and other extremist groups.
Since 2023, emissaries of Lakurawa, a Fulani jihadist group with Sahelian roots and now designated a terrorist organisation, have visited Shiroro.
In return, Sadiku has reportedly sent fighters to support Lakurawa’s operations in Sokoto and Kebbi states, with efforts to co-opt other bandit leaders like Bello Turji.
This convergence, researchers warn, raises the spectre of broader coordination between insurgents and criminals, a trend already observed in the 2022 Kuje prison break and Kaduna train attack, both of which involved joint operations by JAS, ISWAP and Ansaru elements.
While ISWAP has struggled to establish itself in the north central region despite sending dozens of fighters to Kogi in April, JAS’ Shiroro cell remains dominant.
Geography adds to the challenge. Niger State bridges north and south Nigeria and shares porous borders with Benin Republic, providing jihadists access to the Sahel.
Recent arrests of Boko Haram-linked women heading toward the Borgu axis suggest ambitions for further territorial expansion.
“The Shiroro case demands a recalibrated threat map,” ISS warned.
